

The Hidden Wiring

The Mile End Group newsletter

Issue no.1 Autumn 2009

On board HMS Victorious

Peter Hennessy

The Rudder, Not The Rock


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MEG

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The Mile End Group's *The Hidden Wiring*

Welcome to the inaugural issue of *The Hidden Wiring*, a regular look at the machinery of British Government.

History is becoming ever more contemporary. The thirty-year rule on official declassifications may well become a twenty or even a fifteen one in the near future. The Freedom of Information Act is pushing boundaries that few envisaged. Meanwhile, the internet age is making so much material not just available but accessible wherever you are and whenever you want it. Contemporary British history is buzzing as a result.

By contrast, these are tough times for the journalistic trade. The internet has, on the one hand, seen an explosion of outlets and possibilities for journalists but, on the other, this has been increasingly consumed on a free basis. The reduction in press advertising, seen before the credit crunch, has and will only intensify. Financial pressures on the journalistic world means that we will probably see more publications shift from being newspapers to 'viewpapers' – investigative reporting does not always lead to an immediate story and is increasingly seen as expensive.

The reporting of the machinery of government looks likely to be a casualty. Whereas since the 1970s there has been much 'Whitehall watching' by eminent pressmen such as Professor Peter Hennessy and Peter Riddell, the future coverage of how government actually works, as opposed to the simpler world of political 'froth', is threatened. It takes years (and therefore much investment) to know the highways and byways of Whitehall – and longer to gain the trust of those paths' guardians. Understanding the machinery of government is complex, sloggy and ostensibly unexciting. But this is only to the untrained eye which downplays its incredible importance and fascinating insight into the governing process.

The Department of History at Queen Mary (QM), University of London, has had for many years a keen interest in the study of the 'Hidden Wiring' of contemporary

government at all levels (Professor Hennessy published a book by that title in 1995). From this, the Mile End Group (MEG) was created in 2004 as a postgraduate seminar series looking at the worlds of Westminster and Whitehall, past and present. It rapidly evolved into a lecture series attracting increasingly high profile speakers with inside knowledge of the workings of government. Sir John Major, Baroness Manningham-Buller, Sir Gus O'Donnell, Alan Rusbridger, Lord Butler of Brockwell, Lord Malloch-Brown and Sir Kevin Tebbit, amongst others, have all contributed to seminars. One such luminary was *The Anatomist* of Britain himself, Anthony Sampson, who made a plea to the MEG not to ignore the vital significance of gossip to the history of British governance. This should be allied to Professor Hennessy's description of his trade as 'gossip with footnotes'!

Bearing all this mind, the MEG presents the first collection of machinery of government-themed articles. The aim will be to blend the necessary understanding of political developments with a knowledge of the permanent, official side of government, all in an historical context. There will also be the aim of bringing new material for, as Peter Jay says, 'there should be at least one new piece of material in every column'.

We are very pleased with our initial offering: Sir Nicholas Montagu, former Chairman of the Inland Revenue and next Chairman of the Council at QM, has warned against poorly-thought-through machinery of government changes; Professor Peter Hennessy, the Attlee Professor of Contemporary British History at QM, has written of his recent experiences on a Trident submarine at Cape Canaveral; John Rentoul, columnist with *The Independent on Sunday*, charts the changing structure of No. 10 throughout the New Labour years; and Sue Cameron, diarist for the *Financial Times*, shares her concerns for the future of the Senior Civil Service.

The MEG hopes you find value in this initiative, fellow Whitehall-watcher!

Dr Jon Davis is Associate Director of Corporate Affairs, Executive Director of the Mile End Group and Institute, and lecturer of 'Cabinet & Premiership' & 'The Blair Government', all at Queen Mary.

The Rudder, Not The Rock

Nick Montagu warns a new government off the easy temptations of power

Machinery of government changes are an insidious temptation for any Government, new or old.

For the tired or discredited administration, oblivious to clichés about chairs and the Titanic, they can provide the semblance of change and a new dynamism. For an incoming one they offer an easy taste of the headiness of power and a façade of considered strategic direction.

Both should pause for thought. Of course some changes are genuinely needed from time to time, as priorities shift, technology develops or new synergies appear. Merging Inland Revenue and Excise, for example, was overdue - though it's questionable whether the Customs bit should have been rolled in, rather than go under the Home Office. But machinery of government changes are expensive in terms both of distracting civil servants from their core business and of the money required for the physical consequences. Playing with titles doesn't transform business or performance; and the cost of new logos, signs and paper headings can run into tens of millions.

The saga of constantly merging and demerging Transport and Environment under both Conservative and Labour governments stands as a warning to any incoming administration. There is no glaring need for Departmental change - with one possible exception. It is common knowledge that, in the run-up to the 2005 general election, Tony Blair contemplated splitting the Treasury, separating the management and budget functions off into an OMB-type Department, while keeping the core fiscal and economic responsibilities in Horseguards Road. Only his weakness and dependence on Gordon Brown's contribution to a fraught election campaign prevented this. There is a case at least for reconsidering it, especially with a Treasury damaged in public perception and with its talent depleted by the depredations of No 10 and UKFI, and by the lure of the outside world.

But arguably this is a decision for a strong mid-term Prime Minister, rather than a new one. David Cameron, if elected, is unlikely to want a George Osborne disgruntled by losing the power and status for which he has long hungered. So no bets on that one. More interesting, perhaps, is what he would

do with DCSF, which has got a bit unwieldy. Separating off education again would emphasise the strength of Conservative commitment there, but would leave a rump Department of Families seriously weakened. However, this could be spun as deliberate policy: in an area where local and individual responsibilities are integral to Conservative aspirations, a strong central Department could be seen as superfluous and smacking of statism.

A new Prime Minister would be spoiled for choice, coming to power in a recession with the associated spending cuts but with a commitment to better government. The first step should be a rigorous look at what the core business of each Department really is and a determination to concentrate on it, outsourcing or pooling the rest. There's been a lot of hysteria about consultants: in fact, contracting out non-core business with innovative fee structures involving wins for both parties can be far cheaper than keeping civil servants on in the job - especially if Departments pool resources for shared assignments. But there's a caveat - to be effective in this, the Civil Service will need to sharpen its contract and project management skills, which have been the subject of more rhetoric than reality for years.

“So if there's no obvious machinery of government agenda for a new Prime Minister, where should they flex their muscles?”

More sharing within government would bring both better public services and cost savings. Progress in the ten years since the White Paper on modernising government has been grindingly slow. The Blair mantra of “joined-up government” has been forgotten in form and substance, with delayed and limited moves to make Departments organise their corporate services systems through HMRC or DWP, but there's no real sharing. David Varney's role and work as the adviser on “transformational government” seem to have sunk without trace: even the much-vaunted “Tell Us Once” initiative in DWP, to cut down the contacts with government required on a change in circumstances (a 1999 pledge), is only now cranking back into gear.

So there's fertile ground for a new administration intent on genuine improvements in government. They should also get stuck into governance issues. A code of corporate governance published a few years ago by the Treasury simply muddled the water and left open questions that require an answer. The respective responsibilities of Ministerial and Permanent Heads of Department need reviewing - does the Maxwell Fyfe doctrine still hold good? - not necessarily for radical change to the political/non-political balance, but simply because traditional roles have inevitably become blurred by developments like the ascendancy of Special Advisers and, in some Departments, management committees with a Ministerial Chair. That provides the opportunity for a proper look at the role of the non-executive director in government, introduced in Thatcherite fervour but without any true corporate responsibilities.

Tying up that loose end could lead on to genuinely progressive reform of the operational arms of government - an opportunity signally missed when HMRC moved last year to a model involving a non-executive Chairman and a Chief Executive, but with notoriously confused responsibilities. A properly empowered Board, including non-executives, providing oversight and clear accountabilities, could confer autonomy without anarchy, removing from Ministers both association with operational disasters and the temptation to meddle in the day-to-day affairs of the agency.

Not rushing into machinery changes is a sign of mature government and, with a bit of luck, one that David Cameron, if elected, will want to exhibit. One possible, and understandable, exception, given the circumstances which he would inherit and their background, is financial regulation. It is unlikely that Gordon Brown will be able to initiate, let alone complete, serious reforms in the time he has left; and equally unlikely that a new Government would want to leave things as they are. But that apart, there's much on government and governance to be done to achieve genuine improvements and economies in public service. We all know about politicians throwing toys out of the pram - some, like machinery of government changes, are best not put there in the first place.

Nick Montagu, a member and Chairman of Council of the Queen Mary, University of London Council, was a civil servant for 30 years and Chairman of the Inland Revenue 1997-2004

PROFESSOR PETER HENNESSY'S COLUMN:

The Lion and the Unicorn

Standing on the fin of the Trident submarine, HMS Victorious 20 miles off the Florida coast shortly before midnight in mid-May - ploughing through the Atlantic below at 14 knots with a soft, warm breeze above - it's easy to forget what an extraordinary 16,000 ton machine is beneath you, what its for, what in extremis it could do, and just how political this boats and their planned successors are back home. In that tiny space - room for just a few people - one feels literally apart from the world.

The submarine has been at sea for nearly 16 hours completing its dress rehearsal for the test launch of its D5 missile planned for three days time projecting it thousands of miles down into the South Atlantic way beyond Ascension Island as one of the last events of the submarine's long, mid-life refit. The other major nuclear powers - Russia, France and China - already know what is going to happen and when. Under an international agreement, they were told sometime before Victorious shipped out of Port Canaveral for its dress-rehearsal.

In three days time, when the huge missile should, if things go well, burst

out of the sea, the submarine will be packed with VIPs headed by John Hutton, Secretary of State for Defence. But today has been 'special relationship' day on board.

The Americans from Admirals down, are here to scrutinise, audit and validate the Royal Navy's Trident drills and procedures. The Royal Navy does the same for the US Navy when their Trident boats go through the DASO (Demonstration and Shakedown Operation) some of the US officers, like their British counterparts are veterans of Cold War missions 'up north' to watch and listen of Murmansk, in hunter-killer submarines.

The key elements of the UK/US 'special relationship' have long been located at the first and last lines of the British defence spectrum - intelligence (since the sharing arrangements of the early post-war years) and the nuclear deterrent of the day (since the World War II collaboration was restored in 1958). The real, enduring ingredients and symbols of the relationship have been these two 'very special' parts. A physical manifest of the last line of defence was who was on board HMS Victorious that launch rehearsal day and what they were doing. Its equivalent for the first line is the presence of two CIA liaison officers from the American Embassy in Grosvenor Square for the opening section of the fortnightly meetings of the Joint Intelligence Committee in the Cabinet Office. Until recently, the JIC used to meet weekly. Is this **really** the moment to cut its sessions back? The world has not become noticeably more benign or tractable in 2009. Quite the reverse.

Once in the launch area off Cape Canaveral, Victorious' Captain, Commander David Pollock, goes through two countdowns for the pair of missiles (three and ten which have the inert warheads in their nose cones) in case

technical problems affect one or other of them on the day. Before the count begins, the missile is opened for the visiting team on board to reveal the bones of its 'equipment section' on which the warheads rest. Beneath it, rather like some bizarre tree house at the top of a ladder, is the small space into which the missile compartment maintenance technicians can crawl (always two, never one like the firing chain itself from the Prime Minister and Chief of Defence Staff to the Captain of the submarine and his Executive Officer).

I've been inside the 'white forest' of missile tubes before and it always exerts a sobering, quietening effect. But to peer into the Trident's devastating innards for the first time is unforgettably devastating. And with a senior US Navy officer, an American scientist and a UK Naval constructor, I'm right by Tube No. three when its hatch is opened and the

“For all intents and purposes, the Royal Navy and US Navy have fused.”

launch is simulated (there's a thud and the feeling of a car driving over a speed bump). For the Trident crew when No. three is launched for real in three days time that's what they feel but with a bigger thump as 60 tons of missile rushes towards the surface. It will (saving the unthinkable) be the nearest they will ever come to the real thing probably throughout their entire naval careers as these test launches are rare events for the UK. One of the most exclusive clubs in Britain is the seven strong group of Royal Navy Trident Weapon Engineer Officers who have pulled the trigger on the Colt 45 pistol butt with a wire projecting from it which

launches the missile. It will grow to eight when Victorious has tested successfully.

Launch day comes. The USNS Waters, the launch area survey ship, leaves port Canaveral early in the morning with the faster HMS Victorious following to the test area. Lighting strikes - literally. From the Waters, Victorious can be seen 500 yards away opening its vents and starting to dive at 2.45 in the afternoon. By 2.50 only the fin and the rudder are visible. At 2.51 there is a flash of lightning on the darkening far horizon. At 2.56 the submarine disappears beneath the waves as lightning flashes once more 'it's God telling us only He does thunderbolts!' says a wag among the UK observers. Divine intervention or not, the launch is cancelled as lightning within a 50-mile radius is unacceptable for fear that it will interfere with the telemetry necessary for a safe flight into the South Atlantic. At 5.23 Victorious surfaces, it will come out later in the week and try again.

On board in the meantime the Brits hold a seminar on the history of UK nuclear weapons policy and procurement. A key figure is not aboard ship but he features nonetheless throughout the discussion and posthumously shapes much of it - Sir Michael Quinlan, former Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Defence (and a great friend of the Mile End Group) who died in February. 'Big Q', as he was known, influenced the thinking of a generation. Michael would have relished the day and the seminar and, very probably, the launch that never was.

The other figure posthumously in the briefing room was Ernie Bevin, Attlee's Foreign Secretary, who famously roared in Cabinet Committee in the autumn of 1946 that there had to be a 'bloody Union Jack' on the Bomb whatever the cost. Without his intervention, as the financial and diversion of scarce engineering resources argument pressed by the Chancellor of the

Exchequer Hugh Dalton, and the President of the Board of Trade, Stafford Cripps, seemed to be winning the day before Bevin arrived late at the meeting, the group of Whitehall officials, scientists and sailors would not be waiting in the Atlantic off Florida for a Trident with a 'bloody Union Jack on it' to fly out of the sea. The Royal Navy have yet to come up with a name for the 'Successor' boats to the Vanguard or 'V' class. I suggest a 'B' class with HMS Ernest Bevin as its flagship, let's wait and see.

Professor Peter Hennessy is Attlee Professor of Contemporary British History at Queen Mary, and Director of the Mile End Institute of Contemporary British Government, Intelligence and Society.

No10 from Blair to Brown

John Rentoul

It was in Tony Blair's first year as Prime Minister that a new entity was invented in Britain's infinitely flexible constitution. It was called "the centre", and it consisted of the Prime Minister's office, based in 10 Downing Street; the Cabinet Office, which backs onto it; and the Treasury, the headquarters of which is next door.

One of the first jobs given to Sir Richard Wilson, appointed as Cabinet Secretary and head of the Home Civil Service in January 1998, was to review the workings of "the centre". Blair announced the outcome of the review in July, which was couched in fluent Mandarin: Sir Richard "diagnosed a

weakness in looking ahead to future opportunities and threats, and in reviewing the outcome of Government policies and the achievement of Government objectives".

In normal English: "A titanic struggle is developing between the Prime Minister and the Chancellor for control of what they call the delivery agenda; plus they've got special advisers crawling all over the place. As top civil servant, I've got my work cut out."

Most of Sir Richard's changes were tinkering. The Office of Public Service, created by John Major to run "citizens' charters", was absorbed into the Cabinet Office. A Cabinet committee called PSX, "public services and public expenditure", replaced PX, "public expenditure". None of the eight members of the new committee was a minister for a spending department, in contrast to the previous committee.

A Centre for Management and Policy Studies was set up "incorporating a reshaped Civil Service College". The Cabinet Office was rebadged "as the corporate headquarters of the Civil Service". And a Performance and Innovation Unit, based in the Cabinet

Office, was created. "Could this be the return of the Central Policy Review Staff killed off by Thatcher in 1983?" asked Peter Hennessy. It turned out to be one of those historical questions to which the answer is No.

It was not a new Think Tank, as the CPRS was known. Its role was set out in Sir Richard's review: "It will complement the Treasury's role in monitoring Departmental programmes." Translation: "It will duplicate the Treasury's role by providing a parallel system reporting to the Prime Minister."

It didn't work. Blair's first term saw an unprecedented assertion of prime ministerial control over the Government's media relations; but this was not matched by an equal assertion of control over the delivery function. To simplify, Alastair Campbell, who was head of communications as well as a traditional press secretary, got a grip on the Government's message, but there was no one to get a grip of the other half of the governing equation - ensuring that Government action met Labour's pledges and popular expectations.

No10 from Blair to Brown (continued)

Hence the frequent expressions of prime ministerial frustration. To take just one example at random, a memo from Blair to Jonathan Powell on 30 May 1999: "I repeat, again, for the umpteenth time, should we end up in mid-June with schools and hospitals facing cuts, we are in serious difficulty."

It was not until the second term that Blair started to get a grip on this other half, appointing Sir Michael Barber to head a Prime Minister's Delivery Unit. Even so, the idea that Blair commanded a "centre" of unprecedented coherence and power was complicated, above all by the strength of Gordon Brown at the Treasury, which gave the Blair Government its unusual bipolar character - possibly in both senses of the word.

Alan Milburn, one of the cabinet ministers closest to Blair's thinking, describes what was constructed over Blair's first two terms as a "prime minister's department in all but name", but in fact "the centre" was still far from such a model. The Prime Minister's office and the Cabinet Office were integrated more closely than before, but the third leg of the new hybrid, the Treasury, was, if anything, less so. In contrast to, say, Norman Lamont's close co-operation with John Major over the 1992 Budget that helped win that year's election, Brown's Treasury was notably

secretive and unco-operative in its dealings with No 10.

Interestingly, it was Jeremy Heywood who was Lamont's Principal Private Secretary in 1992. He then operated the bipolar system as Principal Private Secretary to Prime Minister Blair, before leaving in 2003 and coming back in 2007 under Brown as Prime Minister to operate a unipolar system once more.

In just two years, Brown has thoroughly recast the structures, personnel and physical layout of the centre at least four times. The most recent change, to a "war room" based at No 12 Downing Street, seems to be designed more for running the long campaign for the 2010 election than for progress-chasing delivery.

Benedict Brogan, one of the best of the current first-drafters of history (also known as journalists), described the post-reshuffle line-up around the horseshoe-shaped table in June 2009 as follows: "Peter Mandelson (First Lord), Tom Fletcher (private secretary), Shriti Vadera (Gordon's Brain), Gavin Kelly (political secretary), David Muir (e-guy), Shaun Woodward (Con trustee) and Jeremy Heywood (de facto ruler), with Mr Brown in the middle. Michael Ellam and the spin duo of Michael Dugher and John Woodcock are nearby in the annex."

A week later the impression of a political war room was reinforced by the drafting of Simon Lewis to replace Ellam, the civil servant who was the Prime Minister's Official Spokesman; Lewis will technically be a civil servant too, but feels like a special adviser. With the PM's Delivery Unit swallowed up by the Treasury and the PM himself distracted from public service reform, this is a retreat to an earlier model of the centre. It could be argued that it marks the permanent adoption of the crisis management model of "Cobra" - Cabinet Office Briefing Room A - that was used by Blair to deal with the petrol crisis, foot and mouth and street crime. And hence as an intensification of the "grip" of the centre.

But it feels more like New Labour retreating to the womb: a media-focused operation more like the party's Millbank headquarters between 1995 and 1997. It looks like Brown repeating Blair's mistake of the early years, of behaving more like an opposition than a government.

John Rentoul is chief political commentator for The Independent on Sunday, and visiting fellow at Queen Mary, University of London, where he teaches contemporary history.

W(h)ither Whitehall?

Sue Cameron

"It gets madder and madder," remarked one Whitehall insider surveying the meltdown of the political class after Westminster's expenses scandal.

Yet as they watch the carnage from the sidelines, **Britain's senior civil servants are themselves at a fateful crossroads.**

Behind them, wrecked beyond repair, is the old model of impartial mandarins speaking truth unto power. Ahead, if they choose the wrong path now, lies the real prospect of losing any significant role in policy making.

True, the financial crisis and the constitutional convulsions following revelations about MPs' finances provide an opportunity for the civil service to reassert itself. Reform is in the air. Yet overhauling civil service structures and methods will not be enough - Whitehall has seen plenty of reforms over the last

twenty years from Next Steps agencies to capability reviews.

Perhaps the time has come for the civil service to develop a new and much more public role for itself, sharing with citizens much of the advice it gives to Ministers - particularly the statistical underpinnings - and turning itself into an advisory gold standard that will win the trust of the public and force politicians to act with greater candour. It would mean a cultural revolution and some in Whitehall will be horrified at the very idea. Yet they cannot remain in their current state.

Their situation is parlous. Power has been draining out of Whitehall for years. Top civil servants have seen themselves usurped by spin doctors, political advisers, quangos, management consultants and unelected so-called experts. All too often officials have been cowed into becoming mere courtiers telling Ministers what Ministers want to hear.

"Civil servants have become used to being terrified," said one Whitehall man glumly. "Its a case of: 'Deliver or we'll get rid of you'." Another notes: "Modern politicians are not prepared to be told the truth and nor do they recognise any division between civil servants and political advisers. There is no attempt to consider whether a job would be better done by officials or outsiders."

The rot may have started under the Tories - remember Margaret Thatcher's strictures about officials being "one of us" - but most civil servants agree that it has worsened under Labour. Number Ten and the Treasury, both heavily populated by political advisers, have become overpowerful while the idea of collective cabinet decision taking has been all but abandoned. "Most Labour Secretaries of State didn't even realise they were meant to be big beasts," sighs one senior Whitehall figure, adding: "The Labour experiment has failed. Policy in areas like health and education is out of synch with what organisations on the ground can deliver. Often when decisions are taken there is no-one in the room who knows about the subject or about how the policy can be delivered - so the policy's crap and the delivery is unattainable. A great deal of money has been wasted."

With Labour's chances of re-election hovering between negligible and zilch, top civil servants are looking to the Tories to reinvent some of the old Whitehall truths. Tory leader David Cameron has talked of cutting the number of political advisers and management consultants while allowing cabinet Ministers and their departments to run their own policies without constant interference from Downing Street. Some in Whitehall believe that Mr Cameron will HAVE (ital) to have his senior Ministers on board in order to make the spending cuts that will be necessary.

Yet when it comes to securing its own future, the civil service should be wary of relying too much on the Tories. However good their intentions, the reality is that in Opposition David Cameron operates through a small clique of people and dominates his shadow cabinet. This is understandable, indeed commendable - with an election to win, he must provide strong leadership and clear messages without being weighed down by collective baggage. In office, no doubt he would avoid the worst excesses of Tony Blair's sofa government and Gordon Brown's neo Stalinism. Yet the chances are that in government he too would want a strong centre and would be tempted by the presidential approach that has become entrenched under Labour.

For Whitehall there is another worry about the Tories. Some senior Tories have doubts about civil service competence. One shadow cabinet minister, usually synpathetic to Whitehall, says: "We've been shocked by the erosion of analytical power in government departments. There seems to have been a decline in the calibre of civil servants."

"Someone I know left Whitehall and returned a few years later to find that instead of doing proper analysis, officials were second guessing Ministers. In another case, a bright graduate joined the Treasury to do economic policy and found 90 per cent of the work was presentation."

So is there any way for civil servants to regain influence and prestige? "Yes - but only if they accept that the traditional model no longer works," says Donald Savoie, Fellow of All Souls, Oxford and Professor of public administration at Canada's Moncton University. "Civil servants have to stop being anonymous and carve out for themselves a public, corporate personality. They need to start briefing citizens, through the media, on the forecasts and the advice that they give Ministers."

Professor Savoie believes civil servants should only go public on their advice AFTER (ital) a decision has been taken and they should remain loyal to

Ministers. Yet once a policy had been announced officials would have to answer publicly for the facts and figures underpinning it.

He is unfazed by the prospect of Ministers and civil servants disagreeing. "It would be no sin against democracy to say that a Minister had rejected civil service advice," he says. We have to open up decision-taking. The public sees policies being cooked up behind closed doors and citizens in Britain and Canada have given up on the system."

Such a change would be radical yet it must be a runner. The public does not value civil servants' expertise because it knows little about them - apart from occasional, unflattering comments by politicians. Meantime high profile people from think tanks, lobby groups and communications companies continue to crowd into the policy space once occupied by Whitehall's mandarins. As we have seen under Labour, all too often their ill-considered policy prescriptions have led to what former cabinet secretary Lord Butler describes as "bad government". Having been elbowed out of the policy making process, it is civil servants who are then charged with making the unworkable work and who are blamed when, inevitably, they fail.

Nobody is going to fight for Whitehall's great ideals unless civil servants do it themselves. Public disgust with politicians and the clamour for democratic reform provides a unique opportunity for civil servants to create a stronger, more independent and more public role for themselves if those at the top give a lead.

Sue Cameron is a columnist at the Financial Times and a former presenter of BBC2's Newsnight, of Channel Four News and of the ITN Parliament Programme.

Future Events

3 November

Professor Christopher Andrew, '100th anniversary of MI5'

17 November


Peter Riddell, 'Transitions of Government'

30 November

Sir Nicholas Montagu, John MacAuslan and Mark Addison,
'Ministers and Permanent Secretaries'

13 April 2010

Professor Keith Jeffery, '100th Anniversary of MI6'



For information of future events and to view transcripts, videos, past events and other information regarding the Mile End Group please visit our website:

www.meg.qmul.ac.uk